Adjusting Vaccine Contracts Could Help Save the World, McCombs Research Finds
- Oct 26, 2021
New research conducted by Diwakar Gupta, Ph.D., professor of information, risk, and operations management at the McCombs School of Business, looks at adjusting the payment structures in vaccine procurement contracts, potentially offering hope to countries that lack enough doses for effective vaccination against COVID-19 and other diseases.
“You cannot prevent the spread unless sufficient numbers of people worldwide are vaccinated,” Gupta says. His research finds that by retooling the design of vaccine contracts, international health agencies could offer incentives for pharmaceutical manufacturers to produce more shots for poorer countries—at no extra cost beyond the originally allotted budget.
Testing his model on an existing pneumococcal vaccine, Gupta found the alternate contract design over 10 years could produce almost 600,000 more doses, or enough to immunize 200,000 more infants. Gupta’s research could make it easier to accomplish the herculean mission of vaccinating not just the industrialized world, but the entire world.
Read the full article from the McCombs School of Business.